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1. Introduction: theory and policy
For several decades, students of the
Soviet-American arms race have sought to
understand its main determinants by un-
dertaking detailed case studies of indi-
vidual decisions on weapons. At times it
seems that there are more arms-race
’theories’ than there are weapons decisions
to explain. Social scientists have called this
problem ’overdetermination’ - the fact that
there are too many plausible explanations
for the same phenomenon and no clear
way of choosing between them.’ 1
A more promising approach to case
studies would focus on key factors that are
claimed to influence the production of new
weapons, according to a particular theory
or explanation of the arms race. One could
then evaluate the competing theories and
identify the more powerful explanatory
factors by conducting parallel case studies
of similar types of decisions, both for
weapons that were produced and for those
that were not.
Those factors that are found both in de-
cisions for and decisions against produc-
tion should logically be considered less
crucial than those that are present in deci-
sions for, yet are missing in decisions
against.
Such a method, based on a ’structured,
focused comparison’, cannot prove that
one theory of the arms race is indisputably
better than another. It does, however, of-
fer a way to evaluate competing explana-
tions in a more rigorous fashion and come
to more meaningful (albeit, still tentative)
conclusions than does the approach that
relies on single case studies.’- 2
Finally, if one is interested not only in
theory, but in policy as well, one seeks an
explanation that helps to indicate how to
effect change. If an explanation is as com-
plicated as reality itself, it provides no
guidance. Thus, a method for identifying
the strongest explanatory factors influenc-
ing the production of weapons should be of
interest whether one defines one’s goals as
’military reform’ or ’stopping the arms
race .
The purpose of this study is to describe
the problem of ’overdetermination’ as it
appears in explanations for NATO’s
weapon production and to illustrate a com-
parative case-study method for eliminating
the weaker explanations in favor of one
with greater explanatory power.3 3
2. Competing explanations
Four decisions on nuclear weapon produc-
tion for NATO will be discussed here, and
two explanations that seem - superficially
- to account equally well for the outcomes
of the decisions. The four cases are: (1) the
production and deployment of Thor and
Jupiter missiles in 1959-1960; (2) the deci-
sion not to produce and deploy the Mul-
tilateral Force (MLF) during the mid-
1960s; (3) the decision to begin production
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of the enhanced-radiation warhead (ERW)
or ’neutron bomb’ in 1978; and (4) the 1979
NATO decision to produce and deploy
cruise and Pershing II missiles.
The explanations both fall into the
category of responses to external de-
velopments. The first - ’action-reaction’ -
tries to explain production of new nuclear
weapons for NATO as responses to Soviet
initiatives. The second - the military ’fix’ -
sees production of new nuclear weapons as
an attempt to restore alliance cohesion
through largely symbolic military means.
These two explanations do not represent
the entire spectrum of theories of the arms
race. It is argued here, however, that they
have figured most prominently in attempts
to explain NATO nuclear decisions. It
should be noted that this study does not
deal with NATO nuclear relations per se.
because it does not see alliance decision-
making procedures as crucial in determin-
ing whether or not the US produces nuc-
lear weapons for NATO 4
Action-reaction appears to work for
three out of four cases: Thor-Jupiter and
cruise-Pershing II were produced because
they were reactions to Soviet programs
(emerging ballistic missile systems and the
SS-20, respectively); MLF was not pro-
duced because there was no Soviet threat
that was not already countered by existing
US strategic systems (and general US
strategic superiority). The neutron bomb
production decision is not explained by
action-reaction, however. Although it was
justified as an anti-tank weapon intended
to offset Soviet superiority in numbers of
tanks, this superiority has existed since
1945 and enhanced-radiation technology it-
self has existed since the late 1950s. Ac-
tion-reaction does not explain why Pres-
ident Carter approved production of ERW
components for the Lance warhead in
1978, why President Reagan approved full
production and assembly of enhanced-
radiation weapons in 1981 or why Congress
funded the W-82 ER-capable warhead in
1984.
The military fix explanation seems to
work for the same cases. It apparently fits
Thor-Jupiter. The decision has been de-
scribed as an attempt to pull the alliance
back together after the Suez crisis of 1956.
The MLF could be explained as a military
fix which was unnecessary and therefore
unsuccessful. The explanation would go as
follows: Although the Kennedy-Adenauer
conflicts of the early 1960s were an alliance
political problem of sufficient seriousness
to warrant a ’military’ solution (and the
MLF was explicitly considered in this
light), many observers felt that alliance
doubts about the American commitment
diminished in the aftermath of the Cuban
missile crisis (because American resolve to
risk nuclear war was demonstrated), and
for this reason the MLF was no longer
necessary.
Again the ERW case is an anomaly.
Carter’s decision to ask the Europeans to
request the weapon before he would agree
to produce it was not viewed as a military
solution to political problems. Rather, it
became a major alliance problem in itself
(one of many that justified the 1979 NATO
decision on political grounds, making that
decision also seem to fit the military fix
explanation). Reagan’s decision to go
ahead with production after Carter had
changed his mind and deferred it certainly
was not intended to mend alliance rela-
tions, and the effect was indeed the oppo-
site.
3. Technological entrepreneurship -
We shall now focus on the anomalous case
~ of the neutron bomb and try to construct
an alternative explanation to account for
those developments that action-reaction
and the military fix fail to explain. The
explanation emphasizes internal determin-
ants for most of the decision process, in
particular the bureaucratic forces that
promote new weapons technologies. It
tries to incorporate external factors at the
later stages of the process, suggesting that
they provide a ’window’ through which the
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new weapon can be promoted. By incor-
porating both internal and external factors
the explanation seeks to avoid the unpro-
ductive debate that followed the original
presentation of the Eigendynamik (self-
generating, internal dynamic) model. 5
Clearly the arms race is driven by both
internal and external determinants. The
important task is to identify which factors
come into play at which stage, and to be
willing to set aside those factors that do
not have great bearing on the decision.
3.1. The neutron bomb: internal pressures
The neutron bomb is a particularly useful
case for evaluating competing explana-
tions. One needs to address the question,
’why was a weapon that was invented in
1958 not produced until the late 1970s?’ If
the conditions for an action-reaction or
military-fix explanation existed during this
period, they were not sufficient to lead to
the weapon’s production. An alternative
explanation is needed - one that can ac-
count for the weapon’s lack of success for
twenty years as well as its ultimate pro-
duction.
The concept of a warhead that kills
primarily with neutron radiation was con-
sidered during the development of the hyd-
rogen bomb in the late 1940s.6 During the
debate over whether to build the hydrogen
bomb, its opponents - most notably, J.
Robert Oppenheimer - argued in favor of
development of tactical nuclear weapons
as an alternative to strategic bombing.
Proponents of the H-bomb, including Ed-
ward Teller, in turn argued that fusion
weapons themselves could have high tacti-
cal value on a battlefield,.7 Thus, while
much of the research conducted at Teller’s
Livermore Laboratory from its founding in
1952 involved high-yield fusion weapons,
by the late 1950s considerable work was
being done on lower-yield weapons for
tactical use. The main breakthrough came
in 1958, as a result of the work of Samuel
Cohen, then a physicist at the RAND Cor-
poration.8 s
Through his contacts in the Air Force,
Teller was able to get its Science Advisory
Board to establish a panel to investigate
the technical feasibility of the enhanced-
radiation concept. The panel, chaired by
Cohen, presented its findings to the Air
Force in the fall of 1958, to an unen-
thusiastic response.9
Teller, Cohen, and the other ERW sup-
porters next tried to sell their idea to the
Navy. Despite some initial interest, how-
ever, the Navy did not pursue enhanced-
radiation warheads for its weapons. The
likely reason is that by the late 1950s most
of the navy’s nuclear programs centered
around nuclear-powered missile-carrying
submarines which had no use for ERWs
and did not need the budgetary competi-
tion. 10
When Teller’s efforts to interest the Air
Force and Navy in producing ERWs
proved futile, he turned to the executive
and legislative branches of the US gov-
ernment and to the civilian leadership of
the Defense Department. Captain John
Morse, in his capacity as assistant to the
chairman of the AEC, tried to reach the
President directly through drafting a
memorandum in support of ’clean’
weapons for tactical use.&dquo; Samuel Cohen
was also in direct contact with the White
House, through the President’s aide, Major
John Eisenhower. In November 1959, the
President himself was briefed on the
ERW. 12
The extensive briefings conducted by
Samuel Cohen and other weapons lab sci-
entists attracted some public attention, and
information concerning enhanced-radiation
weapons and the scientists’ lobbying ef-
forts appeared in the Washington Post and
other publications, as early as 1959. Teller
and his colleagues were by this time mainly
trying to convince the Army to adopt
ERWs as tactical weapons. The fact that
Teller and Cohen turned to the Army only
after unsuccessful attempts to interest the
Air Force and Navy in ERWs belies the
popular impression that Cohen created the
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ERW primarily as a battlefield anti-tank
weapon for European use. As Cohen him-
self writes, ’keep in mind that it was in the
context of Asian scenarios that the neutron
bomb was first conceived’.&dquo;
In any case, Teller and Cohen were not
able to secure Army support for produc-
tion of the ERW as a tactical weapon.
Army officials were particularly skeptical
about the ERW’s effectiveness as an anti-
tank weapon, based on experimental data
indicating ’that only within a relatively
small area near the explosion would the
enemy troops be instantly incapacitated.
Troops occupying a much larger area
would be injured, though before death they
would remain capable of fighting for at
least some time after the irradiation. 14
Thus, the scientific promoters of the
neutron bomb were unable to interest any
of the military services in adopting it as a
battlefield nuclear weapon. The Air Force
preferred its strategic missile and bomber
programs: the Navy favored its Polaris
system; and the Army was preoccupied
with the Vietnam War and later with
stewardship of the Sentinel ABM program.
The scientists were able to gather enough
support for ’clean’ enhanced-radiation
weapons to defeat the comprehensive test
ban, but not enough to produce the
weapons themselves. They had the backing
of the Atomic Energy Commission, the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and
the Defense Department, but without the
sponsorship of a particular service they
could not proceed. 15
3.2. The neutron bomb: a window opens
During the early 1970s, the nuclear
weapons laboratories, which had continued
work on enhanced-radiation weapons,
launched a vigorous campaign to promote
their use on the battlefield. In congres-
sional testimony in 1973, Harold Agnew,
director of the Los Alamos lab, clearly
referred to ERWs when he said:
I know we at Los Alamos have a small, but
very elite group that meets with outside
people in the defense community and in the
various think tanks. They are working very
aggressively, trying to influence the DOD
(Department of Defense) to consider using
these (deleted) weapons which could be very
decisive on a battlefield, yet would limit col-
lateral damage that is usually associated with
nuclear weapons <’
Here Agnew spells out the basis for the
’technological entrepreneurship’ explana-
tion used in this comparative study. Es-
sentially, it refers to a technological pro-
gram of long standing and development
being actively promoted by weapons de-
signers until it finds support among think-
tank analysts, elected officials, and US and
NATO military leaders. At a later stage,
this process is often facilitated by the ap-
pearance of a ’window of opportunity’ in
the form of a Soviet military program or
alliance crisis, by which the weapon can be
justified.
In this case of the neutron bomb, it was
not an ’external factor’ of this sort, but an
internal development that provided the
window. The main problem for the
weapon’s promoters was the lack of a
military sponsor. The Army continued to
reject ERWs in favor of standard nuclear
warheads, on grounds of military effec-
tiveness. In 1973, for example, the Army
submitted a request to modernize its nuc-
lear artillery, but was turned down by the
joint Committee on Atomic Energy, led by
Senator Stewart Symington.
The Army somewhat reluctantly came to
support development of neutron warheads
as the only possibility of getting any nuc-
lear artillery at all. Having had its moder-
nization proposal rejected by Congress, it
could not simply come back with the same
proposal. Therefore, on 29 August 1973,
immediately following the congressional
rejection, the Army Chief of Staff drew up
a memorandum directing a study to
’reexamine’ nuclear-warhead requirements
for artillery projectiles. According to
Samuel Cohen, the memorandum ’re-
questing the study is full of radiation-dose
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requirements for incapacitating military
personnel’, with the concomitant require-
ment to ’minimize collateral damage’, i.e.,
’damage to civilian structure’. ’In other
words’, Cohen writes, ’the memo directed
a neutron bomb study’.&dquo;
Despite the new-found support of the
Army, a key obstacle to production of
ERWs remained - in the person of Senator
Symington. When Symington retired from
the Senate in 1976, there was nothing
further to hinder the approval of ERW
production. Symington’s Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy was dissolved and its
duties assumed by the Senate Armed Ser-
vices Committee; its chair was Senator
John Stennis and its membership included
Senators Henry Jackson and Strom Thur-
mond - all strong proponents of tactical
nuclear weapons. With Symington out of
the way, the Energy Research and De-
velopment Administration (successor to
the Atomic Energy Commission) was able
to include a production request for ERWs
for the Lance missile in the President’s
annual stockpile review of 24 November
1976. President Ford approved the request,
as did the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee in hearings the following March. 18
The ERW production request was first
discovered and publicized by Washington
Post reporter Walter Pincus, who found
mention of it in Senate Appropriations
Committee hearings on ERDA’s Fiscal
Year 1978 public works bill. Pincus pub-
lished a story in the Post on 6 June 1977
entitled ’Neutron Killer Warhead Buried in
ERDA Budget’. This was the first that
most people had heard of the ERW.
The rest of the neutron-bomb story has
been covered well elsewhere.19 President
Carter’s indecision about whether to pro-
duce the weapon - while quite divisive for
the NATO alliance - did not ultimately
affect ERW production. Carter decided in
April 1978 to defer production, but six
months later ordered the Department of
Energy to produce ER components. In
October 1978, production activities began
on the W70-3 enhanced-radiation warhead
for the Lance missile. Several hundred
have now been built and are stored in the
United States, ready to be deployed to
Europe in the event of war or if NATO
allies request them. 20
The latest chapter in the neutron-bomb
saga further confirms the validity of the
’technological-entrepreneurship’ explana-
tion. During the spring of 1984, General
Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Com-
mander, Europe, engaged in a major lob-
bying effort to get congressional approval
for the W-82 warhead for NATO’s 155-mm
artillery - a warhead that can be made into
an enhanced-radiation weapon through the
simple insertion of a tritium module. At an
estimated cost of 2.6 million dollars each,
the new warhead was not popular with the
Congress. Its proponents were able to
convince a couple of key senators to sup-
port the weapon. These senators then at-
tached an amendment to the Defense Au-
thorization Bill to fund the W-82. By de-
ceptively characterizing the amendment as
one that would prohibit production of en-
hanced-radiation shells (in fact it only pro-
hibits their final assembly), and by intro-
ducing the amendment during an all-night
session, the sponsors were able to get it
passed without a roll-call vote at 3:00 A.M.
on 21 June 1984. 21
Thus, the technological-entrepreneurship
explanation emerges as the most convinc-
ing in accounting for the ERW production
decisions.
3.3. Internal pressures and NATO’s nuc-
lear weapons
The main elements of the technological
entrepreneurship explanation are the fol-
lowing : (1) a longstanding technological
program strongly backed by the private or
governmental weapons laboratories re-
sponsible for its development; (2) support
within the military, the academic com-
munity of ’defense intellectuals’, the State
Department, and the relevant committees
of the Congress; and (3) justification for
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the weapon on the basis of long-term
NATO plans. The factors which appear
less important are ( 1 ) support from alliance
political (or even military) leaders in
Europe: (2) public support: or (3) a
genuinely new Soviet threat (as opposed to
an old threat used as a pretext). At a later
stage these factors may come into play and
improve the prospects for the new weapon.
The other cases considered in this paper
reveal a similar pattern. Analysis of these
cases calls into question the action-reac-
tion and military-fix explanations. In the
case of the Thor and Jupiter missiles, for
example, both had received wide support
within the government long before the first
detection of Soviet missile tests in 1955.
By the same token, the military-fix
rationale seems weak. Even before the
British-French-Israeli invasion of Suez in
1956, the US had secured an agreement in
principle to deploy Thor missiles in Bri-
tain. The countries that received the Jupi-
ter missiles - Italy and Turkey - were not
involved in the Suez crisis; their relations
with the US had not suffered; so there was
nothing to ’fix’. One major study of the
issue argues that the effect of the decision
was in fact to worsen relations. That study
finds the sources of the Thor-Jupiter deci-
sion mainly in the promotion of a novel
technology (ballistic missiles) by military
bureaucracies - in other words, what is
termed here ’technological entrepreneur-
ship
Arguments against the action-reaction
and military-fix explanations are more
familiar for the case of the Pershing II and
cruise missiles. They were not developed
as responses to the Soviet SS-20 and
Backfire bombers or as solutions to al-
liance political problems. These later
events provided a ’window’ through which
supporters could push weapons that they
favored for other reasons. The Pershing II,
for example, originated with a 1969 con-
tract to the Martin-Marietta Corporation,
intended to fulfill a broad requirement for
accurate, low-yield, nuclear weapons,
dictated - according to some views - by
NATO’s doctrine of ’flexible response’.
Cruise missiles had also been promoted for
many years, especially by military analysts
who favored their use as conventional
weapons. 23
The military-fix rationale has its difficul-
ties as well. First, one has to consider
whether the concern about the US com-
mitment to Europe originated with Euro-
pean elites, or was induced by certain
American opponents of arms control. As
one analyst has argued, ’(i)n view of the
transatlantic interchange of ideas among
the small group of government officials and
observers who are involved in nuclear is-
sues, and taking account particularly of the
sniping at the SALT process by various
Americans, it is difficult to apportion re-
sponsibility’ for the missile decision to the
Europeans. ’If some European became
concerned over America’s intentions it is
necessary to ask who encouraged and at
times fuelled these suspicions. ’24 The re-
ference here is undoubtedly to Helmut
Schmidt, who many still erroneously be-
lieve called for the missile deployment in
1977. In evaluating the military-fix expla-
nation, one also has to ask why a military
solution was deemed necessary, when in
the past alliance cohesion has been re-
stored through political means. 25 One is
drawn to the conclusion that problems of
alliance cohesion are not sufficient to
explain the emergence of Pershing II and
cruise missiles.
The case of the Multilateral Force is
particularly interesting because it shares
many elements with the cases in which
new nuclear weapons were produced. Yet
in this case a decision was made to aban-
don the MLF. Do the action-reaction and
military-fix explanations account well for
the decision? The analysis presented in this
paper suggests that they do not. An action-
reaction interpretation would argue that
there was no military need for a European-
based nuclear force, owing to overall US
strategic superiority. Many prominent ob-
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servers argued, however, that the US did
not have meaningful or useful superiority
after the Soviets had managed to build a
force of long-range bombers and missiles
that could attack the United States during
the early 1960s. This was Secretary of De-
fense Robert McNamara’s view during the
Cuban missile crisis, for example. At the
same time, a number of officials - includ-
ing General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Al-
lied Commander, Europe - advocated
achieving a ’theater balance’ in Europe in
order to make NATO a ’fourth nuclear
power’. He spoke of Soviet superiority in
land-based medium- and intermediate-
range ballistic missiles - a force that grew
from 500 systems in 1962 up to nearly 750
by 1967. By the action-reaction explana-
tion, some NATO counterweight should
have been produced.
The military-fix explanation for the fail-
ure of the MLF would have to argue that
problems of alliance cohesion were not
sufficiently great to prompt a ’military’
solution. Some analysts point to the for-
mation of the Nuclear Planning Group in
1967 as a substitute for military hardware.
This begs the question, why was a political
rather than a military solution adopted?
The technological-entrepreneurship ex-
planation would argue that the main reason
the MLF failed was because it was not
based on a technological program with
longstanding support among weapons sci-
entists, industrial R&D labs, or any mili-
tary service. Instead, the MLF incorpo-
rated a technological system - the Polaris
missile - that was already being developed
at full speed by Admiral Hyman Rickover
for his submarine fleet. Thus, a key ingre-
dient for successful technological entre-
preneurship was missing. Most of the other
ingredients were, however, present. The
MLF had strong backing within the State
Department, among a number of NATO
governments, and from General Norstad
and his colleagues at NATO headquarters.
4. The ’requirements’ of alternative
explanations
Readers may not agree with the explana-
tion that emerges from this analysis as the
strongest - what is called here ’technologi-
cal entrepreneurship’. Any competing
explanation should, however, be able to
account for the same phenomena at least
as well.
One explanation that claims to do so
focuses on the ’requirements’ of US or
NATO doctrine. This explanation has been
put forward most recently to justify the
production of Pershing II and cruise mis-
siles.’-6 It argues that official doctrine, be it
’massive retaliation’ or ’flexible response’,
determines which weapons are produced.
There are a number of problems with
this explanation. The nature of US and
NATO doctrine is too amorphous and even
self-contradictory to set any definite re-
quirements for weapons. Manfred Worner,
West German Defense Minister, made this
point clearly in regard to ’flexible re-
sponse’, arguing that the doctrine ’is for-
mulated as vaguely as it is because the
interests of all NATO countries must be
straddled.’
The United States is obviously interested, in
the event of a breakdown of the deterrent in
Europe, in containing the military conflict to
the Continent as long as possible - in keeping
it from escalating and prevailing on the
battlefield without endangering American ter-
riroty. By contrast, it is in the European
interest that the risk for the aggressor be
heightened by the prospect of a relatively
quick escalation of the battle.
Worner points out that this ’conflict of
interest is probably irreconcilable’.’-’
It seems reasonable to add that deter-
mining weapons requirements on the basis
of an irreconcilable conflict of interests
would be mainly a matter of opinion (or
self-interest). Does filling a ’gap in the es-
calation spectrum’ make escalation more
certain, or does it increase the prospects
for ’decoupling’? When, according to
NATO doctrine, does strategic parity
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between the superpowers demand new
theater and tactical weapons and when
does it not? Certain NATO strategists have
argued since the mid-1950s that the exis-
tence of parity - or ’nuclear stalemate’, as
it was often called then - demanded new
weapons for NATO.28 These views still
serve as the rationale for new intermediate-
range missiles, modernized nuclear artil-
lery, and enhanced-radiation warheads for
tactical rockets. In what sense does doc-
trine explain the production of all these
weapons? It is argued here that
’technological entrepreneurship’ is a better
explanation.
5. Conclusion and implications
The type of explanation one perceives as
strongest in accounting for weapons pro-
duction suggests the kinds of prescriptions
one would make in order to change current
policy. Action-reaction interpretations that
see NATO nuclear weapons as necessary
rational responses to Soviet initiatives,
logically view Soviet restraint as the only
means of slowing the arms race. Believers
in military-fix explanations are held hos-
tage to the vagaries of alliance relations,
while those who accept doctrine as the
main determinant of new weapons must
also accept official definitions of the ’re-
quirements’ of doctrine.
An explanation based on the notion of
’technological entrepreneurship’ does
suggest ways to influence policy. Some
apparent means of countering the bureauc-
ratic promoters of new technological con-
cepts and weapons include a better in-
formed public and more responsive legis-
lators. In a sense, the latter follows from
the former.
Another important component of a
strategy to counter the bureaucratic and
technological forces that propel the arms
race is a community of independent ex-
perts who can provide alternative analysis
of security issues. This is not to suggest
that such a community should be consi-
dered merely the servant of popular
movements. Rather, as this paper has at-
tempted to demonstrate, methodologically-
grounded historical studies can contribute
both to academic debates as well as pro-
vide some insights for those interested in
influencing policy.
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